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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Mr. Howard's motion to
suppress because he was unlawfully detained.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In December of 2018, Mr. Howard was a passenger in a car when the driver pulled into a
driveway and parked the car. (Tr., p.54, L.14 - p.56, L.1) After that, Idaho State Trooper Green,
who had been following the car, turned on his emergency lights, and pulled his vehicle behind
the car. (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-22.) He testified that he did this because the driver did not use her tum
signal for long enough before turning into the driveway.

(Tr., p.12, L.5 - p.13, L.13.) As

Trooper Green's vehicle pulled behind the parked car, the driver "simply got out of the car and
walk[ed] away, ignoring some exhortations from Trooper Green to come back." (Tr., p.55,
Ls.18-25; Exhibit 1 at 0:25 - 1:00) 1 Mr. Howard also got out of the car and started to walk
away, but Trooper Green told him to come back, and he "immediately compli[ed]." (Tr., p.55,
L.25 - p.56, L.4.)
Trooper Green then asked Mr. Howard to reveal the name of the driver, and Mr. Howard
replied, "I'm not saying her name." (Exhibit 1 at 1: 15 - 1:25.) As a result, Trooper Green
handcuffed Mr. Howard. (Exhibit 1 at 1:20 - 1:40.) He then asked if he could search him, and
Mr. Howard said he would rather not be searched.
1

(Exhibit 1 at 1:50 - 2:00)

Almost

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the dash-cam video recording from Trooper Green's
vehicle was admitted as State's Exhibit 1. (Tr., p.19, L.10 - p.20, L.3.) Because there are two
audio recordings on the exhibit-one from the inside of the car, and one from Trooper Green's
microphone-it is easier to hear Trooper Green's conversations with Mr. Howard, and the other
people at the stop, if the "InCar" button in the audio selections is turned to off (See Tr., p.20,
Ls.10-22.)

1

simultaneously, Mr. Howard said, "I don't know why I'm being detained." (Exhibit 1 at 1:55 2:00.) Trooper Green said, "Because she is just acting suspicious as hell and ran in the house."
(Exhibit 1 at 2:00 - 2:05.) When Mr. Howard said there was no reason he should be detained,
Trooper Green said, "You're being stopped because she didn't use her turn signal hardly at all,
okay, that's why she's being stopped." (Exhibit 1 at 2:10 - 2:20.) He went on to say, "Well, the
fact that she runs inside real quick, and then you're not telling me her name, that's the problem.
That's why you're being detained." (Exhibit 1 at 2:25 - 2:35.)
While Trooper Green was still questioning Mr. Howard, a backup officer arrived, and
Trooper Green told that officer about the driver walking away.

(Exhibit 1 at 2:35 - 2:45.)

Trooper Green said he was going to search Mr. Howard for weapons before putting him in the
patrol vehicle, and Mr. Howard volunteered that he had a knife in his pocket, so Trooper Green
took the knife. (Exhibit 1 at 2:45 - 3:05.) The two officers then left Mr. Howard handcuffed in
the back of Trooper Green's vehicle and went to locate the driver. (Exhibit 1 at 3:15 - 6:10.)
During that time, at least one more officer arrived on the scene, and Trooper Green can be heard
explaining the situation to him. (Exhibit 1 at 5:10- 5:35.)
When Trooper Green returned to the car with the driver, one of the other officers said he
saw marijuana inside the car, and the car was subsequently searched. (Tr., p.56, Ls.19-23.)
Pursuant to the search, the officers discovered two backpacks-one that contained women's
clothing, and one that contained men's clothing and contraband. (Tr., p.56, L.24 - p.57, L.5.)
Based on that discovery, Mr. Howard was arrested, and a digital scale with methamphetamine
residue was found on his person in the search incident to arrest. (Tr., p.57, Ls.12-14.)
Mr.

Howard was

subsequently

charged

with

one

count

of possession

of

methamphetamine, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of possession of
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paraphernalia with the intent to use. (R., pp.25-26.) Mr. Howard filed a motion to suppress and
a brief in support of the motion in which he argued that his detention was unlawful. (R., pp.2839.)2 The State filed a brief in opposition to the motion and asserted that the motion to suppress
should be denied for three reasons: 1) Mr. Howard did not have standing3; 2) His detention was
lawful; 3) Even if his detention was unlawful, the inevitable discovery exception applied, and
therefore the evidence should not be subject to suppression. (R., pp.56-68.)
After a hearing, the district court granted the motion to suppress. (Tr., p.58, Ls.1-19;
R., p.74.) The court found that, because Mr. Howard "would not provide the trooper the name of
the driver, simply refused, he is handcuffed and put him into the back of the trooper's vehicle
after being questioned." (Tr., p.56, Ls.5-9.) It noted that Mr. Howard was under no duty to tell
Trooper Green the name of the driver. (Tr., p.56, Ls.10-12.) The district court also took note of
the fact that, when the driver was later brought back to the car and Mr. Howard would not reveal
her name, Trooper Green threatened Mr. Howard "with being charged with obstruction ifhe does
not give up the driver's name.

Again, a duty which did not exist."

(Tr., p.56, Ls.12-18.)

Additionally, it held the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply to any of the evidence based
in part on the fact that there was no identification in the backpack, so there was nothing to show
that Mr. Howard possessed it. (Tr., p.58, L.20 - p.59, L. 1.)
The State filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's order granting the
motion to suppress. (R., pp.75-77.) On appeal, it argues Mr. Howard's detention was lawful
because it was justified by "officer safety." (Appellant's Br., pp.7-13.) It also argues that, even
if Mr. Howard's detention was unlawful, the evidence should not have been suppressed.

2 As the State notes (Appellant's Br., p.4 n.3), Mr. Howard also raised another issue in his brief
(R., pp.36-39.) That issue is not relevant to this appeal as it pertains to a separate case.
3
The State abandons the standing argument on appeal.
3

(Appellant's Br., pp.13-23.) Finally, it argues that the district court erred "to the extent that it
purported to suppress any statements or observations, or any other physical evidence .... " when
it granted the motion to suppress. (Appellant's Br., pp.23-26.)

4

ISSUES
The State lists the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err when it determined that Trooper Green unlawfully
detained Howard?

II.

Even if Trooper Green unlawfully detained Howard, did the district court err by
suppressing any evidence?

(Appellant's Br., p.6.)
Mr. Howard rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has the State failed to show the district court erred when it held that Trooper Green
unlawfully detained Mr. Howard?

II.

Has the State failed to show that the district court erred in suppressing all the evidence?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The State Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Held That Trooper Green
Unlawfully Detained Mr. Howard

A.

Introduction
The State's argument that Mr. Howard's detention in handcuffs was justified by officer

safety concerns is specifically contradicted by the video of the traffic stop and the district court's
findings. Despite the State's insistence that Mr. Howard's detention was justified by Trooper
Green's concern for his safety, in ruling on Mr. Howard's motion, the district court did not find
that officer safety was a valid concern in this traffic stop. In fact, it never mentioned officer
safety in ruling on the motion. Rather, it found that Mr. Howard was detained because he would
not reveal the driver's name. Therefore, it is implicit that the district court did not find Trooper
Green's testimony credible.

It is also clear there was no justification for handcuffing and

detaining Mr. Howard for officer safety.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a "district court's order granting a motion to suppress usmg a

bifurcated standard ofreview." It "accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light
of those facts." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014) (internal citation omitted). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995).
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C.

The District Court Properly Held That Mr. Howard's Detention Was Unlawful Because
He Was Detained Without Reasonable Suspicion, And The Video Showed That Trooper
Green Handcuffed And Detained Mr. Howard-Not For Officer Safety-But Because
Mr. Howard Would Not Reveal The Driver's Name
The United States and Idaho Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 17. Warrantless searches and seizures are
presumptively unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). To overcome that presumption, the State has the burden of
proving that a seizure fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement and was
reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Halen, 136
Idaho at 833.
If the government fails to meet its burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal

seizure, including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegality, is inadmissible.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19
(2012); see also State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927) (holding that evidence obtained in violation
of Article I, § 17 of the Idaho State Constitution must be suppressed).
The Idaho Constitution provides additional protections, over and above those of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 4 Idaho provides additional guarantees
beyond the federal constitution whereby its citizens are shielded from governmental interference
to a greater extent than under the federal system.

4

Idaho's constitution protects against

The State argues that Mr. Howard has "waived any argument based on the claim that Article I,
Section 17 provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment" because, while he cited to
the Idaho Constitution in his motion, he did not argue it specifically in his brief in support of the
motion, or at the hearing. (Appellant's Br., p.8 n.4.) However, the district court clearly found
the argument was properly before it as it specifically relied on the Idaho Constitution in reaching
its holding. (Tr., p.55, Ls.3-10, p.58, Ls.14-19.) Therefore, this argument has not been waived.
7

governmental interference and emphasizes the freedom from seizures enjoyed by Idaho's
citizens. Article I, § 1 lays out the foundational core of Idaho's relation to its people:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
These provisions guaranteeing liberty and freedom with one's body and property are not in the
federal constitution.
In addition, Article I, § 17 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
Although similar to the Fourth Amendment, Idaho's protections are broader. This was
pointed out in State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 88-89 (2004): "Although the wording of the two
constitutional provisions is similar, this Court has at times construed the provisions of our
Constitution to grant greater protection than that afforded under the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution." The Idaho Supreme Court has also discussed
the freedoms from governmental interference enjoyed by Idaho citizens:
Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in Idaho is individual
liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike the mountains, and float the
rivers of this state without interference from the government. That is, police treat
you as a criminal only ifyour actions correspond.

State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 298 (1988) (emphasis added).
In this case, Trooper Green treated Mr. Howard as a criminal even though he had done
nothing wrong, and the district court correctly held that Trooper Green's seizure of Mr. Howard
was unlawful, and the evidence should be suppressed because no exception to the exclusionary
rule applied. It stated, [B]ased upon the Fourth Amendment that prohibits unreasonable searches
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and seizures, and Article I, Section 17, the court finds there is no exception that has been
presented that's applicable and the evidence gained after the stop against Mr. Howard is
suppressed." (Tr., p.58, Ls.14-19.)
The district court found that Trooper Green did not have reasonable suspicion to justify
Mr. Howard's continued detention. (Tr., p.58, Ls.1-10.) "An investigative detention is a seizure
of limited duration to investigate suspected criminal activity and does not offend the Fourth
Amendment if the facts available to the officer at the time gave rise to reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity was afoot." State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citations omitted). "Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires more than
a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion. The test for reasonable suspicion is
based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of the stop."
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Further, "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). To
determine if a detention "becomes unreasonable, the court is to consider: (1) the duration of the
invasion imposed by the additional restriction; and (2) the law enforcement purposes served."
State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 554 (1998) (citing State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420,423 (1995)).
"If the investigative detention becomes unreasonable, the detention is transformed into an

arrest." Id. "Factors to be considered in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto
arrest include the seriousness of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the
detention, the reasonableness of the officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as
the encounter unfolds." State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
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In this case, there were no facts available to Trooper Green that gave rise to reasonable
suspicion that Mr. Howard was involved in criminal activity of any kind. Thus, the district court
held, "[T]here is nothing presented that Mr. Howard was engaged in criminal activity at the time.
He was not the perpetrator o[r] the reason for the stop and he did not flee.

Nothing was

presented by the evidence that there was any reasonable articulable suspicion to continue
detaining the passenger of the vehicle that had already come to a stop prior to the officer putting
his emergency lights on." (Tr., p.58, Ls.1-10.)
Apparently conceding that there was m fact no reasonable susp1c1on to support
Mr. Howard's prolonged detention, the State claims instead that "it is error to conclude that
Howard could be detained only if he was suspected of criminal conduct." (Appellant's Br., p.9.)
In support of this argument, the State relies largely on United State Supreme Court precedent
regarding the danger inherent in traffic stops, and its own speculation as to what could have
happened if Trooper Green had let Mr. Howard go on his way as he was required to do.
(Appellant's Br., pp.9-13.) While there is no question that a traffic stop initially results in a
detention of all the occupants ofa car (Appellant's Br., p.10), Idaho authority makes it clear that
a passenger cannot be seized and placed in handcuffs beyond that initial detention for officer
safety purposes or to control the scene unless the risk is substantial.
This Court has only allowed police officers to use handcuffs in limited investigatory
detentions such as the one in this case to address two concerns: officer safety or flight. Pannell,
127 Idaho at 424. In either situation, the risk must be "substantial." Id. (emphasis added). For
example, in State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873 (1987), "the substantial risk of imminent violence was
readily apparent and justified the officer's use of 'reasonable force' to maintain the 'status quo."'
Pannell, 127 Idaho at 424 (quoting Johns, 112 Idaho at 878). There, a solo officer initiated a
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traffic stop of a "suspected murderer," who had killed the victim with a knife. Johns, 112 Idaho
at 877. The officer had seen the suspect remove a knife from his car before the stop and, upon
frisking the suspect, found another knife. Id. "[T]here was some slight resistance" when the
officer removed the second knife. Id.

The Court stated that the situation in Johns was "an

extraordinary case" where handcuffs were necessary for the officer's safety. Pannell, 127 Idaho
at 424.
By contrast, in Pannell, the fact that the defendant "might have posed a threat to the
officers' safety . . . was not sufficient to meet the high threshold needed to justify the use of
handcuffs as part of an investigative detention." Id. (emphasis added). There, officers initiated a

traffic stop of one defendant shortly after he left his house. Id. at 421, 424--45. Even though in
that case there was a domestic disturbance report, the warning of weapons in the defendant's
house, and an intoxicated defendant who reached behind the seat of his car, the Court held that
the use of handcuffs was "a degree of force" that was not justified. Id. at 424-25. The Court
recognized that the defendant was not physically violent, "fully compliant with the officer at all
times," and had no weapons on him. Id.
The same was true here. Mr. Howard did not pose a substantial risk of violence or flight.
Indeed, he was cooperative with Trooper Green; he admitted that he had a knife in his pocket,
and while he initially started to walk away from the scene, he immediately complied when
Trooper Green told him to come back. The State asserts that Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323
(2009) stands for a broad proposition that passengers in a car can be detained under any
circumstances "because officer safety concerns are implicated if passengers are permitted to
simply walk away from an ongoing traffic stop .... " (Appellant's Br., p.10.) Johnson does not
stand for the proposition that all passengers in vehicles subject to stops for traffic violations can
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be handcuffed.

Rather, as with any seizure analysis, it 1s judged on the totality of the

circumstances.
Further, in Johnson, the issue was not whether an extended detention was unreasonable,
but whether the patdown for weapons was justified. 555 U.S. at 326. The Court found the
patdown was appropriate because, among other things, the stop was made near a neighborhood
"associated with the Crips gang."

Id. at 327.

Additionally, the officer who spoke with

Mr. Johnson noticed that he was wearing "clothing, including a blue bandana, that she
considered consistent with Crips membership," and the officer "noticed a scanner in Johnson's
back pocket, which struck her as highly unusual and cause for concern .... " Id. at 328.
No such concerns existed here, so it is not surprising that the district court never
mentioned officer safety in reaching its holding. For one thing, a backup officer arrived on scene
within two minutes of the initial stop. (Exhibit 1 at 0:35 - 2:35.) And within another two or
three minutes, more officers arrived. (Exhibit 1 at 5:10- 5:35.) Flight or "controlling the scene"
were not valid concerns either; Mr. Howard immediately complied with Trooper Green's order
to come back to talk to him.
The State also relies on United States v. Sanders, 510 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2007), but
Sanders is also inapposite. (Appellant's Br., p.10.) There, when the officer began following the

car, he was aware the driver's license was suspended. Id. at 789. He also believed that the
license plate number was not registered to the car. Id. The officer stopped the car in what he
"considered to be a high-crime area," and when the passenger got out of the car, the officer
ordered him to get back in. Id. The court stated that when the officer stopped the car, he was
"unassisted in a high-crime area, it was dark, and he was outnumbered by the occupants of the
car." Id. at 790. And when the court balanced "the concerns for officer safety" against the

12

"intrusion on Sander's liberty interest," it found that the intrusion was minimal because "[b]y
ordering Sanders to reenter the car, Officer Uredi simply reinstated the status quo; the only
change in Sanders's circumstances was that he was inside of, rather than outside of, the stopped
car." Id. at 791.

Therefore, the court held the detention was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. Id. With the exception that both Johnson and Sanders involved a passenger, the
cases share no factual similarities with this case.
In this case, there was no indication Trooper Green had any concerns about the status of
the driver's license or the car's registration before he stopped the car.

There was also no

testimony that he stopped the car in a high-crime or unsafe area. Moreover, Trooper Green
certainly did not reinstate the status quo by telling Mr. Howard to get back in the car. To the
contrary, he handcuffed him and put him in his police vehicle, so the intrusion on his liberty
interest was anything but minimal.

The State's reliance on State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364

(Ct. App. 1999) and State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357 (Ct. App. 2000)-in the section of its
brief arguing that the "nature of the detention" here was reasonable-is similarly misplaced.
(Appellant's Br., p.12.) For example, in Frank, the officer was "dispatched to investigate a
report of three men and suspicious noises at a storage facility at about 10:10 p.m." 133 Idaho at
368 (emphasis added). Additionally, when the officer first located Mr. Frank, he had several
items in his hands, and the officer had reason to believe there was "a possible burglary in
process." Id. at 366, 368.
More importantly, the video in this case specifically contradicts the State's argument
because it disproves Trooper Green's testimony as to the reason he detained Mr. Howard. When
asked in court what he did when Mr. Howard would not divulge the driver's name, he said, "I -for my safety, I detained him in handcuffs, searched him for weapons." (Tr., p.14, Ls.20-24.)
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And when asked why he detained Mr. Howard with handcuffs, he said he was "trying to control
the traffic stop." (Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20.) This testimony, however, was plainly controverted by the
video. Trooper Green put Mr. Howard in handcuffs, not because he was trying to control the
scene or was concerned about his safety, but because Mr. Howard would not tell him the driver's
name. (Exhibit 1 at 1:15 - 1:40.) He even told Mr. Howard this. He said, "[Y]ou're not telling
me her name, that's the problem. That's why you're being detained." (Exhibit 1 at 2:25 - 2:35.)
Indeed, the district court's factual finding was that, "because the defendant would not
provide the trooper the name of the driver, simply refused, he is handcuffed and put into the back
of the trooper's vehicle after being questioned." 5 (Tr., p.56, Ls.5-9) Therefore, it is implicit that
the district court found Trooper Green's testimony regarding safety concerns not credible. In
short, the State's argument fails because the video of the stop clearly supports the district court's
holding that Mr. Howard was unlawfully detained in handcuffs without justification. Thus, the
district court properly held that Mr. Howard's prolonged detention was unlawful under the U.S.
and Idaho Constitutions.

II.
The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Suppressing All The Evidence

A.

Introduction
In the district court, the prosecutor argued that, even if Mr. Howard's detention was

unlawful, the evidence should not be suppressed because the inevitable discovery exception to
the exclusionary rule applied. 6 Nevertheless, on appeal, the State also argues that the attenuation

5

The State does not argue that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.
The State argues that there were two separate exceptions argued in the district court.
(Appellant's Br., p.13.) However, both of those arguments concerned inevitable discovery. One

6

14

exception applies. It also argues that the district court somehow erred in the breadth or scope of
its holding.

These arguments were not raised below, so they are not preserved for appeal.

Moreover, with respect to inevitable discovery, the State fails to sufficiently address or disprove
the basic premise that, absent the unlawful detention of Mr. Howard, none of the evidence
subsequently discovered could have been tied to him because his identity would never have been
known to the officers.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a "district court's order granting a motion to suppress usmg a

bifurcated standard ofreview." It "accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous, but may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional principles in light
of those facts." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014) (internal citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Inevitable Discovery Exception To The
Exclusionary Rule Did Not Apply In This Case, And The State's Remaining Arguments
Are Not Preserved For Appeal
This Court has recently reiterated that whether the inevitable discovery exception to the

exclusionary rule applies requires an analysis of the position law enforcement would be in if
there was no unlawful action: "The premise is that law enforcement should be 'in the same, not a
worse, position that (sic) they would have been' absent the misconduct." State v. Maxim, 165

argument was that because marijuana was seen in plain view in the car, the subsequent discovery
of the other evidence was unrelated to Mr. Howard's unlawful detention, and therefore inevitable
discovery applied. (R., pp.63-67; Tr., p.51, Ls.15-18.) The other argument was that the
evidence would have been discovered pursuant to an inventory search of the car. (R., p.67;
Tr., p.51, L.18 - p.52, L.4.) The State's subsection "C" concerns the plain view issue, and
subsection "D" concerns the inventory search issue. Because both of those subsections focus on
whether inevitable discovery applies, and the other subsections concern issues that are not
preserved for appeal, Mr. Howard does not separate his responses to the State's various
subsections.
15

Idaho 901, _ , 454 P.3d 543, 550 (2019) (quoting State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017)).
Once a defendant shows a Fourth Amendment violation, the burden shifts to the State to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered by
lawful means. Id. at 547, 550.
Naturally, the vast majority of cases addressing inevitable discovery focus on physical
evidence. In the seminal case of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-48 (1984), for example, the
Court held that-despite the police violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel-a murder victim's body was not subject to exclusion because the body would have
been found pursuant to an ongoing search that was not related to the unlawful questioning. The
Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would put the State in a worse position than it would have
been in without the unlawful questioning. Id. at 447-49.
In this case, while some of the physical evidence may have ultimately been discovered
through lawful means, Mr. Howard's identity was not discovered through lawful means. Rather,
it was only discovered as a result of his unlawful detention.
inevitable discovery exception also.

This bars application of the

Although this situation is unusual, the United States

Supreme Court recognized the problem of unlawful discovery of identity in United States v.
Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980). There, in its analysis of a case in which an illegal

arrest was not the means by which the defendant was identified-as the victim had also
described the defendant after the crime-the Court noted, "[T]his is not a case in which the
witness' [s] identity was discovered or her cooperation secured only as a result of an unlawful
search or arrest of the accused." Id. at 471-72. Crews was decided prior to the Court's formal
adoption of the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix, but the identity issue has come up in other
inevitable discovery cases. For example, in People v. Leonard, No. 270638, 2008 WL 2185186,
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at *11 (Mich. Ct. App. May 27, 2008) (unpublished)7, a majority upheld the trial court's ruling
that the inevitable discovery exception did not apply to a lineup identification because "the
prosecutor failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's identity inevitably
would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. Rather, "the police discovered defendant's
identity as a direct result of the violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and it cannot
be said that defendant's identification would have been obtained without the police misconduct."
Id.

That is precisely what happened in this case. Mr. Howard's identity would have never
been discovered if he was not unlawfully detained. Indeed, Trooper Green did not learn of
Mr. Howard's identity until well after the unlawful detention began.

(Exhibit 1 at 11 :20 -

14:00.)
The State's arguments skirt the identity issue, but it clearly recognizes the problem. It
acknowledges that defense counsel argued the State "would have had trouble connecting the
evidence found in the vehicle to Howard if Howard had been permitted to leave." (Appellant's
Br., p.18.)

But it then argues that, "Whether it is easy or difficult to support a charge of

possession by means of the evidence located in the backpack is irrelevant to the question [of]
whether that evidence should be suppressed." (Appellant's Br., p.18.) With this statement, it
appears the State is trying to make the point that, whether law enforcement knows the identity of
7

Mr. Howard recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does not
cite them as authority for a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely references them as
historical examples of how a learned court has analyzed the identity question at issue. Compare
Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
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an alleged perpetrator, is not relevant to whether evidence against him should be suppressed.
This is nonsensical. When a defendant's identity that would enable the State to bring charges
against him is discovered only as a result of law enforcement's unlawful actions, the evidence
must be suppressed.
Nevertheless, the State focuses on the physical evidence found after the unlawful
detention. It argues, "it was the detention of the vehicle, not Howard, that led to the discovery of
the evidence in the vehicle." (Appellant's Br., p.16.) This is likely a true statement, but it
ignores the fact that the evidence could not have been tied to Mr. Howard if he had not been
unlawfully detained because it was his unlawful detention that led to the discovery of his
identity. The State also asserts, "Howard acknowledged that the evidence in the vehicle was not
the product of his detention.

It follows immediately that there is no basis to suppress that

evidence." (Appellant's Br., p.18.) This does not "follow immediately" because this is the
wrong analysis. The State acknowledges the proper analysis (Appellant's Br., p.19), but never
applies it. The question here is as follows: if law enforcement was placed in the same position it
would have been in without Trooper Green's unlawful detention of Mr. Howard, would they
have been aware of Mr. Howard's identity? The answer is no. Therefore, it was not inevitable
that the evidence discovered could have been tied to him.
Indeed, the district court's decision focused on the identity issue. It relied on the fact that
there was no identifying information in the backpack containing contraband that could tie that
evidence to Mr. Howard. (Tr., p.57, Ls.6-8, p.58, Ls.20-25.) If there had been, then of course his
identity would have been discovered through lawful means because once the officers observed
marijuana in plain view, they had probable cause to search the car and the containers. But that is
not what happened here.
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The same inevitable discovery analysis applies to the scale found on Mr. Howard's
person-the State's subsection "E." (Appellant's Br., pp.21-23.) Again, if Mr. Howard had not
been unlawfully detained, law enforcement would not have been aware of his identity, and he
would have been free to walk away.

Thus, there would have been no arrest and no search

incident to arrest.
Moreover, the State makes a cursory and unsupported statement in its subheading that
Mr. Howard conceded that his search incident to arrest was "independent of his illegal
detention." (Appellant's Br., p.21.) To the contrary, Mr. Howard made no such concession, and
the State does not identify this alleged concession in its subsection "E." That is because there
was no concession. In fact, Mr. Howard argued that, "[W]ithout having him there and the things
that are in his pockets, the State's really left with a young lady, who takes off from the scene,
never says that the stuff belonged to my client, and is driving a car that belongs to another
person." (Tr., p.34, Ls.12-17.)
Additionally, the State's argument in subsection "E" is an attenuation argument that is
not preserved for appeal. In the State's brief in opposition to Mr. Howard's motion to suppress
at the district court-and at the hearing-it argued inevitable discovery applied to the scale
because the "evidence was only discovered during a search incident to arrest, after the evidence
inside the vehicle was found." (R., p.67.) On appeal, however, the State asks this Court to hold
that the scale should not have been suppressed because the attenuation exception to the
exclusionary rule applies to the scale. (Appellant's Br., pp.21-23.) This issue was never raised
below. In fact, the only time attenuation came up was with respect to the other case, which
concerned a bench warrant. (See Tr., p.39, L.17 -p.41, L.4, p.52, L.5 -p.53, L.2) Nevertheless,
despite prophylactically citing to State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) and
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acknowledging that appellate court review is limited to the arguments raised below (Appellant's
Br., p.12), the State argues attenuation applies in this case. Relying on State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841 (2004), it claims the three-factor test for attenuation supports its application to the evidence
discovered on Mr. Howard's person. (Appellant's Br., pp.21-23.) Again, because this argument
was not raised below, it is not preserved for appeal. See State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _

445

P.3d 147, 151-52 (2019) (noting that exceptions to the exclusionary rule are similar but holding
that, "it cannot be said that raising one necessarily implicates the other.")
Even if it was preserved, the State's argument that, "Trooper Green's conduct in
detaining Mr. Howard was not flagrant or for an improper purpose" is directly contrary to the
district court's factual findings, which the State does not dispute. (Appellant's Br., p.22.) The
district court specifically found that Mr. Howard was detained because he would not reveal the
name of the driver, and he had no duty to reveal that name. 8 (Tr., p.56, Ls.5-12.)

Not only was

he detained, he was also handcuffed without justification. As such, this was both flagrant and
done for an improper purpose.
In the State's subsection "F," it argues that, "to the extent that [the district court]
purported to suppress any statements or observations" or any physical evidence beyond that
already discussed, "it erred again and separately."

(Appellant's Br., p.24.)

This argument

appears to challenge the breadth of the district court's order granting Mr. Howard's motion to
suppress. However, in the district court, the State never objected to the breadth or scope of
Mr. Howard's motion to suppress. In fact, it made no arguments that were even remotely similar

8

This finding also directly contradicts the State's claim that there was "no contrary evidence"
that Trooper Green detained Mr. Howard "for his safety while he attempted to locate the driver."
(Appellant's Br., p.22.) Moreover, the video recording of the stop provides that contrary
evidence.
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to the State's argument on appeal in subsection "F." Therefore, this issue is also not preserved
for appeal.
Additionally, the State appears to be challenging conjectural holdings of the district court
when it asserts, "to the extent that it purported to suppress any statements or observations .... "
and "[t}o the extent that the district court intended to suppress Howard's identity . . . . "
(Appellant's Br., pp.24-25 (emphasis added).) It is a basic tenet of appellate law that appellants
can only challenge actual holdings of a lower court. If that was not the case, appeals could go in
any absurd direction.

Here, the district court was clear that it was suppressing "evidence

gathered against the defendant after he was seized by Trooper Green," and that included but was
not limited to the backpack located in the vehicle. (R., p.74.) Clearly, that was intended to apply
to all the incriminating evidence.
Nevertheless, the State argues, "To the extent that the district court intended to suppress
Howard's identity, doing so is also contrary to the principle that the 'identity of a defendant or
respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as fruit of an unlawful
arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred."'
(Appellant's Br., p.25 (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984).) Again, this
issue was never raised below.
It is also questionable whether the Court's statement in Lopez-Mendoza was meant to

apply to all identity evidence. As the Tenth Circuit noted in United States v. Olivares-Rangel,
458 F.3d 1104, 1110 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted), the Lopez-Mendoza Court used
that language when addressing a jurisdictional issue: "Dealing with the Lopez claim first, the
Court held that the immigration court retained jurisdiction because '[t]he mere fact of an illegal
arrest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding.' It was in this context in which the
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Court noted that the 'body' or identity of a defendant is never suppressible as fruit of an unlawful
arrest." The court later stated,
We do not read Lopez-Mendoza as exempting from the "fruits" doctrine all
evidence that tends to show a defendant's identity. Rather, the Supreme Court's
statement that the "body" or identity of a defendant are "never suppressible"
applies only to cases in which the defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the
court over him or her based upon the unconstitutional arrest, not to cases in which
the defendant only challenges the admissibility of the identity-related evidence.
Id. at 1111.
Regardless, without this issue being raised in the district court in the form of an objection
from the State, or perhaps a motion to reconsider, and without some clear indication that the
district court intended to suppress Mr. Howard's identity, this issue is not properly before this
Court. Similarly, the State's additional attenuation argument at the end of its subsection "F" is
not preserved for appeal because it was not raised in the district court. (See Appellant's Br.,
pp.25-26.) In sum, it is clear that the district court correctly held that the evidence should be
suppressed in this case because of Mr. Howard's blatantly unlawful detention, and the inevitable
discovery exception did not apply because Mr. Howard's identity was discovered only as
a result of that detention.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Howard respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order granting
his motion to suppress.
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2020.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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